Vol.15 No.02 (2024), 442-450
DOI: https://doi.org/10.61841/turcomat.v15i2.15464

Federated Cloud Approaches for Multi-Regional Payment Messaging Systems

1st Avinash Reddy Segireddy
Lead DevOps Engineer
ORCID ID : 0009-0002-9912-0629

***Abstract*—Payment messaging systems are becoming an essen- tial element for many cross-border financial processes. However, supporting the growing volume of payment messages while adhering to local data residency policies requires significant investments, which can be a barrier for many regional players. Federated cloud approaches—data-sharing partnerships with cross-border regions that reciprocate the processing of mes- sages—could help multi-regional cloud providers offer such services in a cost-effective, secure, and compliant manner. The candidate federated architecture models are examined from key aspects of multi-regional message-processing and offering- resilience perspectives. These aspects include the support of local data residency; treaty-based interoperability for data-sharing under local sovereign laws; a reduced attack surface; coverage of service-messaging supply chains; and support of incoming financial borders where Director Exposure and common mes- saging protocol. By enabling low-latency, cost-efficient legal- standardized cost-based reciprocal payment messaging; with copy-matching support; and for fully managed, self-service ser- vices.**

***Index Terms*—Federated cloud, multi-regional, payment messaging, data residency, interoperability, security, latency,Federated Cloud Computing,Multi-Regional Payment Systems,Cross-Border Payment Infrastructure,Cloud Interoperability,Payment Messaging Standards (e.g., ISO 20022),Data Localization and Compliance,Distributed Financial Architecture,Secure Data Exchange,Scalable Financial Cloud Ser- vices,Interbank Connectivity and Resilience.**

I. INTRODUCTION

Cross-border payment messaging is plagued by latency caused by the fragmentation of the messaging systems re- quired and the data residency requirements mandated in many regions. Proposed solutions to the problem include using regional payment hubs that operate under the architecture of the respective regions. While these solutions reduce the latency within those regions, they do not fully address the latency of the entire cross-border chain. A federated cloud approach can be employed to remedy this latency for both the operational and message flows through the automated migration of message data traces across regional borders. Federated cloud architectures are proposed as the evolution of cloud technologies toward a distributed, multi-regional model best suited to support the needs of geographically distributed organizations and institutions. These approaches, however, have not been accurately or appropriately adopted in the payment messaging space and, consequently, remain very limited. A multi-regional payment messaging solution, based on cloud technologies, that supports payment data residency



Fig. 1. Federated Cloud Approaches

compliance and is capable of cross-border payment messaging should therefore be considered.

A. Problem Statement

The availability of cross-border payment messaging solu- tions that can meet the requirements of several banks and jurisdictions is imperative to expedite the implementation of instant cross-border payment services. However, existing platforms tend to be best effort, highly decentralized networks that cannot guarantee data sharing with the receiving bank within a certain time frame. A transition toward transaction- oriented messaging offered by a payment service provider for the banks within a region is a plausible approach to overcoming underlying constraints. Federated approaches to implement such multi-regional payment messaging services are desirable, for they can minimize latency while simulta- neously responding to regulatory demands. Real-time gross settlement systems running on a domestic currency are mostly interconnected. Nevertheless, certain barriers still delay a monetary transfer from one region to another because services in some regions are not accessible during their respective nighttime. The minimum time required to send a payment message across the globe remains much above the target latency for a banking transaction. Enabling instantaneous transaction services, thought of as a communication between the withdrawal bank and the transfer service using the payment messaging level-3 standards, is a reasonable requirement for a service aimed at banks under the same payment system.

B. Key Requirements for Multi-Regional Payment Messaging

Cybersecurity concerns and data protection regulations are already fragmented. Country-specific payment messaging net- works are emerging (e.g. NIP in Brazil, UPI in India) to handle these issues locally with low latency. For banks, relying on multiple local payment messaging networks is inefficient. A multi-region federation of payment messaging networks solves latency and regulatory issues while enabling these emerging local networks to remain independent in operation and governance. Central banks of the regions can retain com- puting/resource autonomy while maintaining a secure payment messaging corridor. These federated approaches must satisfy several critical features, including data residency in countries and regions, high availability in compliance with national and international legislation/laws and regulations/treaties/other agreements, security of data in transit and at rest, and legal aspects and customer obligations. The likelihood of succeeding in a fully federated solution requires a high level of effort.

II. Architectural Models for Federated Payment Messaging

Two architectural models consider how functionality is organized across regional providers. For payment messag- ing, a Fully Federated approach distributes all capabili- ties across independent providers in different jurisdictions. Latency-sensitive cross-border data exchanges take place over already-established channels, minimizing regional residency challenges but extending the threat surface. The Partially Fed- erated approach saves asset persistence for a single provider in each region but allows one message queue and ledger to govern all protocols and manage regional flow ordering. This perspective is guided by the key requirements that a multi- regional payment messaging function must satisfy (Section 1.2). Such an architecture must be fit for purpose, enabling data use cases while minimizing the risk exposure associated with federation. The trade-off between latency and risk surface is crucial for data-sensitive regions, where trust in technical



Fig. 2. Risk Surface Proxy

	A	B	C
A	5	140	190
B	140	5	160
C	190	160	5

jurisdiction and provides resiliency should the payment messaging service in the destination jurisdiction become non-operational—it is possible to route the message to other service providers in the destination region. Importantly, the ability of payment senders and recipients to monitor and statistics such a message is also a core capability. Similarly, the ability of a service provider to deliver messages to either gap—in this case look at sending or looking at receiving is also required. The cross-region capability allows a region whose service providers do not exchange messages with each other to still allow users to send messages to users in a region serviced by national service provider. The consequence of multiple trading partners is crucial for encouraging participation in such a payment messaging service, and hence should also be supported.

Equation 01: End-to-end latency model

Arrival rate: λ (msg/s) Service rate: μ (msg/s) Utilization: $\rho = \lambda/\mu < 1$

Steady-state condition. For stability we require $\lambda < \mu$, i.e.,

$\rho < 1$

Waiting-time and response-time facts (M/M/1): Mean time in system (queue + service):

$$E[R] = \mu - \lambda 1 \quad (1)$$

Mean waiting in queue (excludes service):

$$E[Wq] = \mu(\mu - \lambda)\lambda = \mu - \lambda\rho \cdot \mu 1 \quad (2)$$

Mean service time: E[S]=1/μ Consistency: E[R]=E[Wq]+E[S] **End-to-end latency across a path** solutions often lags behind regulatory maturity.

A. Fully Federated Model

$$Ltotal = L0 + i \Sigma \mu i — \lambda i 1 \quad (3)$$

The fully federated model enables the widest range of capabilities across cloud providers and regions. Payment messages issued within one region traverse a public payment messaging network, so data traversing the border are visible to actors in other jurisdictions. This exposes the payment to fraud detection capabilities operated by the destination

Partially Federated Ledger and Message Queuing

When deploying a multi-regional payment messaging sys- tem, a Partially Federated model may provide a viable alternative. The core federated pattern still applies, but the edges of the payment messaging network may freely connect to other external messaging systems. All external connections are established on a case-by-case basis, and any data flowing along these external connections must be carefully evaluated to determine whether its transmission is subject to applicable regional laws. The message queuing model and use of ledgers at the regional messaging resource still facilitate high availability and low latency interchange of messages across the standard regions of the system. In this model, for messages originating from region A and destined for region B, a queue is maintained at the message queuing service for region B, even when region A does not have a live connection to region

B. After the interception of the message intended for region B, the message queuing service of region A is responsible for delivering the message to region B when live connectivity is re-established. While each regional deployment may continue to be operated by a separate entity, the ecosystem of standard regions can be treated as a highly available and eventually consistent distributed system. Depending upon the use-case of the payment system being administered, any conflict-ordering issues related to such eventual consistency can also be easily addressed.



Fig. 3. Latency vs Utilization

III. Interoperability and Standardization

Orders of messages between payment providers naturally require cross-border connectivity; however, the underlying message format, protocol bindings, and identity framework should also enable cooperation between providers. To this effect, at least one interoperable format shall be developed, adopted by the providers, and exposed through their respective entry points. Each payment provider may additionally implement, extend, or modify the specifications, provided that all agreements are versioned and compatible with previous versions. Furthermore, the security and privacy implications around data handling would be simplified if all data exchanged between providers could be classified as non-sensitive, thereby reducing the compliance burdens for each provider and the parties involved in the exchange. Sufficient data minimization and pseudonymization strategies should therefore be in place to cope with the requirements established in the various regu- lations, as detailed in Section 4.2. The four main regulations affecting the exchange of payment-hole information also affect the institutions involved in the exchange and shall be mapped. Nevertheless, they could serve as a guideline for all members wishing to participate in the message-exchange mechanism.

Fig. 4. Interoperability in Multi Cloud Environment

A. Message Formats and Protocols

A federated cloud architecture for multi-regional payment messaging relies on compatible data formats and communication protocols that enable interoperability and an open ecosystem regardless of cloud provider or country regulatory environment. A minimal subset of formats and corresponding protocols is identified. Future payment messaging services accomplish business message transport via a corresponding standardized and publicly available communication protocol. Versions are published to accommodate different sets of fields for backward compatibility and possible extension by regions despite minimal coupling. Regions implementing a subset of fields have the opportunity to interoperate with other regions while determining a more cautious extendibility path. Message structure and content information are defined, together with the corresponding schema with data types based on the Open API Specification of the OpenAPI Initiative. The message schema enables automatic development of a corresponded API/SDK, speeding up the implementation of the service by each region. Versioning of the schema is defined to reduce the impacts of change, allowing each region to determine correspondent tim- ing for deployment. Finally, an extensibility proposal considers the decision-making process, ensuring backward compatibility while allowing regions to deploy additional fields.

B. Identity, Authorization, and Compliance

Federated Payment Messaging requires all actors—data senders, receivers, and distributors—to know how to identify each other across regional providers. Identity solutions such as Sovrin enable report-type relationships, helping organizations determine when they trust another entity's claim, yet proper control over the federation is essential. Regions may not want their identity federation to be a trusted party for other regions. Solutions must therefore keep trust external to the federation and avoid introducing new vulnerabilities. Access to resources must generally follow the data-at-rest rules for location juris- diction, but the implementers must also ensure that the data bring-back procedures have the appropriate fallbacks. Regional regulatory frameworks usually contain guidance on storing these controls. Payment flows should converge on proper compliance controls along their distribution path. Distributed Identity solutions, such as the Rebooting the Web of Trust Project's KERI system, help protect data flows within proper compliance boundaries. These systems allow parties to prove identity without ongoing relationships that create extra trust, making the authorization a mere matter of curve comparison in Zero Knowledge Proofs; however, there are new trusted-party concerns that require oversight.

IV. Data Residency, Sovereignty, and Privacy

Data residency, sovereignty, and privacy concerns are highly territorial in nature. Cross-border exchange of data is limited by various jurisdictional constraints. Data having associated privacy attributes may not be transferred out of a region, or, if not prohibited, must comply with the privacy protection provisions of the region receiving the data. For these reasons, data residency and minimization are the two main attributes that can be considered while federating a service. Regulatory requirements may demand that data related to customers located within a specific jurisdiction must remain within the said jurisdiction. For example, a common regulatory principle in the European Union is that all data about EU members must remain within the EU. In the context of the payment messaging service, any transfer of data among the federated cloud providers would require compliance with the relevant cross-border transfer rules. Given that a cross-border transfer of data

among the federated cloud providers may introduce latency (client latency) and may not be permitted for high-availability requirements, the fully federated model is more suitable for a payment messaging service. By design, such transfers are eliminated without compromising high availability. However, data localization regulations also mandate that such transfers must be in line with the privacy regulations of the cross-border transfer receiving jurisdiction.

Equation 02: Availability composition Fully-Federated path

$$AFF = Afe \cdot Alink \cdot Afe \cdot Aq \cdot Aq \quad (4)$$

Partially-Federated with HA queue at B Non-queue leg:

$$Aleg = Afe \cdot Alink \cdot Afe \quad (5)$$

HA queue at B (two active replicas): availability of "at least one up" is

$$AHA - queue@B = 1 - (1 - Aq)2 \quad (6)$$



Fig. 5. Availability Comparison (Fully vs Partial Federated)

utilization rho	latency ms fully
0.1	149.23
0.12	149.26
0.13	149.28
0.15	149.31
0.17	149.34
0.19	149.37
0.2	149.4
0.22	149.43
0.24	149.46

TABLE I: LATENCY VS UTILIZATION (COMPUTED)

Overall:

$$APF = Aleg \cdot [1 - (1 - Aq)2] \quad (7)$$

A. Jurisdictional Constraints

Because federated payment messaging operates across mul- tiple jurisdictions, regional regulatory requirements inform architecture design choices. Many jurisdictions impose strict localization requirements for personal data and even for sensitive business data.4 As a consequence, when possible, regions should limit message queuing to only those transaction details that require storage beyond their respective region's boundaries. Explicit regulatory considerations aligned with cross-provider compatibility constraints are discussed in Sec- tions 3.2 and 4.2. Reduced message lifespan and the periodic purging of queued, non-consumer data should further alleviate concerns. In regions that impose tight data localization or localization-equivalence constraints on data originating within their jurisdiction, a fully federated solution

is likely needed. Depending on the region and the granularity of localization- equivalence rules, a partially federated approach could still be applied as long as data exchange is restricted to those regions where localization-equivalence requirements are satisfied.

B. Data Minimization and Encryption

Data minimization plays a key role in aligning payment messaging systems with data privacy, data protection, or information disclosure laws and regulations. In the context of payment system messaging and non-repudiation, this means not sending information that can allow reconstruction of the relevant information to the destination jurisdiction except for the subset of data that has been denied or is specifically required for the transaction, such as fraud detection or to meet the specific jurisdictional investigation and surveillance law enforcement requests. For example, the data in a request or notification for a transaction from a payment service provider (PSP) to the payment platform must among others be limited to the identity of the parties directly involved in the transaction as indicated by data protection regulations. There is a high level of assurance that the confidentiality and integrity of the exchange of information between the various parties can be ensured, even across jurisdictions that might have legislation demanding the interception of the communications, provided that appropriate end-to-end encryption of the communications between the various parties is enabled by the infrastructure for both storing (at rest) and sending (in transit) the encrypted data. Data minimization and enforcement of encryption for both at rest and in transit information addresses the chain of trust between the parties successfully from the perspective of operational security analysis but data-in-transit interests need to be investigated further from the perspective of an adversary threat agent motivation to discover the data content for own gain.

V. Security, Risk, and Trust in Federated Environments

Federated clouds are by definition shared environments with unknown parties. While this can extend the trust boundaries of traditional deployments and maintain close control over risk, it also creates new opportunities for malicious actors. Understanding the risk landscape, trust boundaries, and countermeasures is thus critical before selecting a federated architecture for multi-regional payment messaging. The threat model considers an attacker with one or more objectives: 1. Infiltrate the system. 2. Evade acceptance testing during an operation and gain access to the data. 3. Intercept or inject messages during transit. 4. Cause a service outage. 5. Misuse the provided services or message queue(s). Concrete mitigation measures are then defined for each objective. Governance and auditing play a significant role in reducing the attack surface during operation or support, exposing only the required interfaces to external entities, and ensuring the access is strictly limited and temporal.

1) Threat Model and Risk Mitigation: Federated product architectures face a distinct risk landscape given their reliance on often-weak trust boundaries between operational entities. Those boundaries determine what an attacker can achieve, while potential failure modes indicate system weaknesses that necessitate concrete mitigation strategies. Concrete mitigations range from technical controls to governance layers and oper- ational safeguards. A focused threat activity model identifies specific areas of risk for further investigation. Road map, refer- ences, and other mitigation issues are relegated to a separate description. The attacker's goal is benign system operation.



Fig. 6. An overview of implementing security and privacy in federated learning

Possible failures include security breaches at the federation or structure provider; unavailability or malfunction of the

structure provider; or severe operational fault lines within the federation. The potential for an opportunistic insider to exploit the federation's trust relationship with customers is ad- dressed via events that trigger alert, response, or investigation in service-level agreements or memoranda of understanding. Other incidents that require federation intervention involve risk exposure that exceeds management allotments. Security risks—especially those of information loss or the unauthorized destruction of proven messages—are covered by established reliability standards for a third-party custodial arrangement, fortified by an appropriate indemnity scheme.

A. Secure End-to-End Messaging

For transactions involving multiple cloud providers, secure E2E messaging requires coordinated lifecyle management of key pairs, alerting third-party Message Queuing providers of sensitive data being sent or received, and managing routing of secrets outside the standard dataflow. Alerting may happen through a signal in the header of the message being sent (which the Message Queuing operator checks for and takes action on as appropriate) or a separate channel that is sufficiently secured. The secrets would be encrypted with a key that is shared (asymmetric) or otherwise distributable (symmetric) between the sender and recipient. Such an encryption scheme shall be used every time sensitive data is sent to a provider that does not have an E2E connection to the intended recipient of the message. An incident response playbook shall define circumstances which require third-party Message Queuing providers to respond to incidents related to data traversing their services. How E2E control will change these triggers and the required actions will be addressed.

VI. CONCLUSION

Federated cloud approaches effectively meet the needs of a multi-regional payment messaging system, providing an economical path to better data residency and reduced latency. A Fully Federated model enables resilient cross- border communication without trust relationships, but this generosity comes at scale and latency costs. A Partially Federated pattern optimizes for latency and cost while maintaining availability and alignment with data residency laws; it supports non-federated message queuing for increased throughput and scales to non-resident actors. The architecture captures indispensable requirements—data residency, high availability, compliance, and security—and meets key security objectives. Emerging trends such as edge and confidential computing services, together with common regional governance frameworks, promise to further alleviate latency and trust challenges of transactional workloads. Federation enhances host-continent deployment of data- forwarding services, substantially reducing the distance sensitive data crosses with consequent latency, privacy, and security benefits. Rapid interactions between end-point hosts improve throughput on large volumes and offer a sensible path to compliance with data-residency regulations. Such compliance is critical as regions now impose rules prohibiting the transfer of personal and sensitive business data from their jurisdiction, shaping data flows for the foreseeable future.

Model	Availability (monthly)	Cost $/million msgs
Fully Federated	0.997802	1.542029
Partially Federated	0.998001	1.263623



Fig. 7. Egress Cost bar

Equation 03: Cost proxy (egress per million messages)

GB per million messages (GiB denominator, as in the paper):

$$GiB\ per\ 1M = 10243106 \cdot S \quad (8)$$

Egress cost per 1M messages:

$$Cost1M = ce \cdot 10243106 \cdot S \cdot k \quad (9)$$

A. Emerging Trends

Next-generation payment systems are likely to leverage edge locations for improved latency. Cloud providers are evolving their edge offerings to support containers, thereby providing a mechanism to run a function close to the user. Transactions and smart contracts involving non-fungible to- kens (NFTs), which can be hosted in cloud computing infrastructures, have also gained traction. The confidentiality of sensitive information is becoming increasingly important. Operating in a federated model, where message information is shared with third parties, can be a sticking point for potential customers. Technology that provides confidential computing environments, such as Intel SGX, can provide solutions from the cloud provider end. In such environments, the plaintext data will not be available even to the owner of the computing node hosting the transaction. Confidential clouds are evolving toward establishing a standard environment that allows the integration of third-party service providers into the environ- ment but maintains the confidentiality of the data. On the regulatory front, multiple initiatives are focusing on enabling interoperability between different Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) services and security controls. A standardized set of information elements for user and application identification, which works across such services, will facilitate the convergence process for implementing a federated model for payment messaging. The combination of protocol layer, format, and backend will provide a pathway for regulatory requirements to be satisfied.

REFERENCES

[1] Park, K. (2024). "Andy Warhol and the Inadequacy of the Fair Use Doctrine." Southern California Law Review Postscript, 97(PS81)

[2] Schiavo, F. P., Monforte, S., & Venticinque, S. (2016). FaaS: Federation-as-a-Service. In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Cloud Computing and Services Science (pp. 283–290). SCITEPRESS.

[3] Paleti, S., Mashetty, S., Challa, S. R., ADUSUPALLI, B., & Singireddy, J. (2024). Intelligent Technologies for Modern Financial Ecosystems: Transforming Housing Finance. Risk Management, and Advisory Services Through Advanced Analytics and Secure Cloud Solutions. Risk Management, and Advisory Services Through Advanced Analytics and Secure Cloud Solutions (July 02, 2024).

[4] Chowdhury, A. G. (2024, June 3). Everyone's a critic! From Warhol to Eleanor, when IP law takes the stand on art and pop culture. Daily Journal. Retrieved from https://www.dailyjournal.com/articles/385938- everyone-s-a-critic-from-warhol-to-eleanor-when-ip-law-takes-the-stand-on-art-and-pop-culture

[5] Koppolu, H. K. R., & Sheelam, G. K. (2024). Machine Learning- Driven Optimization in 6G Telecommunications: The Role of Intelligent Wireless and Semiconductor Innovation. Global Research Development (GRD) ISSN: 2455-5703, 9(12).

[6] Bhuskute, S. S., & Kadu, S. (2021). A study on federated cloud computing environment. International Journal of Recent Technology and Engineering, 10(2), 187–193. https://doi.org/10.35940/ijrte.B6311.0710221
Volante Technologies. (2022). The profound impact of ISO 20022: Exploring payments modernization in the UK and beyond. Volante Technologies.

[7] Challa, S. R., Challa, K., Lakkarasu, P., Sriram, H. K., & Adusupalli, B. (2024). Strategic Financial Growth: Strengthening Investment Man- agement, Secure Transactions, and Risk Protection in the Digital Era. Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data Disciplines, 1(1), 97-108.

[8] Marella, V. C., Erukude, S. T., & Veluru, S. (2024, September 7). The impact of artificial intelligence on traditional art forms: A disruption or enhancement. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.07029

[9] Caramiaux, B., Crawford, K., Liao, Q. V., Ramos, G., & Williams, J. (2024, February 6). Generative AI and creative work: Narratives, values, and impacts. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.03940

[10] Yellanki, S. K. (2024). Leveraging Deep Learning and Neural Networks for Real-Time Crop Monitoring in Smart Agricultural Systems. American Data Science Journal for Advanced Computations (ADSJAC) ISSN: 3067-4166, 2(1).

[11] Zhou, A.-L. (2024, July 22). A relational (re)turn: Revisit interactive art through interaction and aesthetics. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.00878

[12] Motamary, S. (2024). Transforming Customer Experience in Telecom: Agentic AI-Driven BSS Solutions for Hyper-Personalized Service Delivery. Available at SSRN 5240126.

[13] Grba, D. (2024, February 26). The shady light of art automation. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.19107

[14] Lee, C. A., Cheung, S., Dinh, T., Cohn, R., & Harang, R. (2020). The NIST cloud federation reference architecture (NIST Special Publication 500-332). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.500-332

[15] Inala, R., & Somu, B. (2024). Agentic AI in Retail Banking: Redefining Customer Service and Financial Decision-Making. Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data Disciplines, 1(1).

[16] Ewing, J. (2024). Pop on Paper: Lichtenstein, Ruscha & Warhol. Tyler Museum of Art Review. (Note: If this is an exhibition review rather than article, treat as such.)

[17] My Art Broker. (2024). Andy Warhol: The original influencer artist. Retrieved August 30, 2024, from https://www.myartbroker.com/artist-andy-warhol/articles/andy-warhol-original-influencer-artist (Although 2024, may still be relevant for 2024 context.)

[18] Pandiri, L., & Chitta, S. (2024). Machine Learning-Powered Actuarial Science: Revolutionizing Underwriting and Policy Pricing for Enhanced

Predictive Analytics in Life and Health Insurance.
[19] Toosi, A. N., Calheiros, R. N., & Buyya, R. (2014). Interconnected cloud computing environments: Challenges, taxonomy, and survey. ACM Computing Surveys, 47(1), Article 7. https://doi.org/10.1145/2593512
[20] Lesiuk, C. (2023, May 13). Andy Warhol and photography: A social media (exhibition review). Memo Review. Retrieved from https://www.memoreview.net/reviews/andy-warhol-and-photography-a- social-media-by-caitlyn-lesiuk
[21] Nandan, B. P. (2024). Revolutionizing Semiconductor Chip Design through Generative AI and Reinforcement Learning: A Novel Approach to Mask Patterning and Resolution Enhancement. International Journal of Medical Toxicology and Legal Medicine, 27(5), 759-772.
[22] Villari, M., Fazio, M., Dustdar, S., Rana, O. F., & Ranjan, R. (2016). Osmotic computing: A new paradigm for edge/cloud integration. IEEE Cloud Computing, 3(6), 76–83. https://doi.org/10.1109/MCC.2016.124
[23] Combe, T., Martin, A., & Di Pietro, R. (2016). To cloud or not to cloud: A study of cloud computing security risks. Computers & Security, 68, 154–165. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2017.04.007
[24] Agentic AI in Data Pipelines: Self OptimizingSystems for Continuous Data Quality, Performance,and Governance. (2024). American Data Science Journal for Advanced Computations (ADSJAC) ISSN: 3067- 4166, 2(1). https://adsjac.com/index.php/adsjac/article/view/23
[25] Chen, L., & Zhang, Y. (2024). Federated data exchange frameworks in multi-regional banking systems: A regulatory perspective. Financial Technology Review, 18(3), 211–230.
[26] Inala, R., & Somu, B. (2024). Agentic AI in Retail Banking: Redefining Customer Service and Financial Decision-Making. Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data Disciplines, 1(1).
[27] European Central Bank (ECB). (2024). Cross-border instant payments and data sovereignty: Technical perspectives. ECB Payments Report 2024.
[28] Microsoft Azure. (2024, May). Federated multi-cloud deployments for compliant financial data management. Microsoft Cloud Architecture Center.
[29] Meda, R. (2024). Predictive Maintenance of Spray Equipment Using Machine Learning in Paint Application Services. European Data Science Journal (EDSJ) p-ISSN 3050-9572 en e-ISSN 3050-9580, 2(1).
[30] Ramesh, K., & Patel, D. (2024). Secure message queuing in distributed financial architectures: Comparative latency analysis. ACM Journal on Distributed Ledger Technologies, 4(1), 55–70.